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Ensuring the Full Freedom of Religion on 
Public Lands: Devils Tower and the Protection 
of Indian Sacred Sites 
GEORGE UNGE* 
Federal land management agencies historicaUy have disregarlkd 
American Indian cries for protection of sacred sites on public lands, 
and the federal judiciary consistently has supported such action ac-
cording to a formalistic interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. This Note takes issue with the pattern of religious 
oppression in the context of public land management ITy positing a 
more inclusive, ''fun,,'' conception of religious freedom under the First 
Amendment. This Note then analyzes the recent controversy at Devils 
Tower National Monument as an important opportunity to Imak 
the trend and embrace Indian religious freedoms around sacred sites 
on public lands. 
INTRODUCTION 
Devils Tower National Monument (DTNM) is a site of conflicting 
uses.! Located in the rather remote corner of northeastern Wyoming, 
the National Monument nevertheless hosts hundreds of thousands of 
tourists each year, including more than 6,000 technical rock climbers 
annually in recent years.! Devils Tower-boasting some of the longest 
and most vertical continuous crack climbs in the world-is a climbing 
* Editor-in-Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 1999-2000. I am 
grateful to Aviam Soifer for his guidance and insight. 
1 See National Park Service, Devils 'lOwer National Monument, Final Climbing Managmrent 
Plan (visited Nov. 5, 1998), <http://www.nps.gov/planning/deto/detotoc.html> [herein-
after "FCMP"], Purpose and Need for the Plan, Introduction; FCMP, Finding of No 
Significant Impact [hereinafter "FONSlj, parts G-18, G-20. According to John Dorst, Pro-
fessor of American Studies at the University of Wyoming: "Devils Tower is a massive stump 
of striated, volcanic rock, perhaps most familiar as the landing site for those childlike ali-
ens who descend from heaven in the techno-sublime mother ship of Steven Spielberg's 
Close Encounters of the Third Kind. "JOHN DORST, LOOKING WEST 8 (1999). 
I See MARy ALICE GUNDERSON, DEVILS TOWER: STORIES IN STONE 130 (1988); FCMP, 
supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Current Climbing Use and Management; 
FCMP, supra note 1, Graphs and Tables, Registered Climbers at Devils Tower from 1989-
1994. 
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mecca.S The relatively undisturbed landscape of the National Monu-
ment also is home to sundry species of plant and animallife.4 Moreo-
ver, numerous Indian tribes believe that Devils Tower is imbued with 
sacred and cultural significance.5 Consequently, many Indians oppose 
climbing of any sort on the tower because they believe such activity is 
sacrilegious.6 Even so, many climbers want to continue climbing on 
the tower.' Therein lies the rub, with the National Park Service (NPS) 
positioned among the conflicting sacred and recreational interests as 
the federal agency charged with managing DTNM.8 
This Note: (1) examines the NPS's attempts to reconcile con-
flicting uses at DTNM through the Final Climbing Management Plan 
(FCMP) adopted in 1995 and modified in 1996;9 (2) presents the liti-
gation that the FCMP engendered, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass 'n v. Balr 
bitt, in which the district court looked skeptically upon NPS efforts to 
protect Indian religious freedoms;lO and (3) suggests an alternative, 
more inclusive view of Indian religious practices and freedoms which 
would allow the NPS to protect Indian sacred interests at DTNM.ll 
5 See FCMP, supra note 1, Graphs and Tables, Registered Climbers at Devils Tower from 
1989-1994. 
4 SeeFCMP, supra note 1, Environmental Consequences, Natural Resources. 
5 See FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management Plan, A 
Voluntary Closure to Climbing in June; FCMP, supra note 1, Environmental Consequences, 
Cultural Resources. 
6 See FONSI, supra note 1, part E-l. 
7 See id., part A 
8 See FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Legal and Administrative 
Considerations. 
9 See gmeralEy FCMP, supra note 1. 
10 See gmerally 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit entirely 
sidestepped the Constitutional issue by holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to chal-
lenge the NPS's FCMP: 
The named individual recreational climbers whose climbing activities have been un-
deterred by the FCMP have established no injury in fact and therefore do not have 
standing. Further ... commercial climbing guide Andy Petefish did not substantiate 
his claim of economic injury as a result of the voluntary closure ...• Even if other 
Bear Lodge members have elected not to climb inJune, that decision is one of several 
choices available under the plan and is not an injury conferring standing .... In 
short, the Climbers "claim that the Constitution has been violated, [but] they claim 
nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a conse-
quence of the alleged Constitutional error. " 
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 1999 WL 261624, *7 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation 
omitted). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 66-98. 
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Of course, to understand the sacred site controversy at Devils 
Tower, and more importantly, to understand where the dialogue 
around sacred site protection should be, one must first come to grips 
with the relevant history and precedents. To this end this Note exam-
ines two competing visions of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment--one grounded in formalism, the other built upon an 
understanding of "full and equal"I! or "full and free"IlI religious free-
dom.I4 This Note then traces the formalist line of reasoning through 
the relevant strand of sacred site precedents,I5 including the Supreme 
Court's 1988 decision in Lyng v. Nurthwest Indian Cemetary Protective 
Ass'n,I6 while concomitantly juxtaposing a "full" understanding of re-
ligious freedom. This Note then unpacks the district court's decisions 
in Bear Lod~ to reveal its formalist underpinnings.I7 Finally, this Note 
endorses "full" religious freedom-rather than traditional formal-
ism-as the means to ensure Indian religious freedoms at Devils 
Tower and elsewhere. 
I. THE CONFUCT AT DEVILS TOWER: AN ATTEMPT AT 
COMMON GROUND 
A Final Climbing Management Plan 
In response to the conflict between climbers and Indian religious 
practitioners at Devils Tower, the NPS issued a Final Climbing Man-
agement Plan (FCMP) for DTNM in 1995.18 The stated objectives of 
12 James Madison's Proposed First Amendment in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SoURCES, AND ORIGINS 1 (Neil Cogan ed., 1997). 
15 ThomasJefferson's Draft of the Vnginia Constitution in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 239 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950). 
14 For purposes of this Note, ideas of "full and equal" and "full and free" religious 
freedoms are considered under the umbrella of "fullness" or simply "full" religious free-
dom. 
15 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, et aI., 485 U.S. 439 (1988); 
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 
1980), affg455 F. Supp. 2d 141 (1977); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 
(6th Cir. 1980), affg 480 F. Supp.608 (1979); Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. 
United States, 548 F. Supp.182 (D. Alaska 1982); Crowv. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D. S.D. 
1982); Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989); Havasupai Tribe v. 
United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd, sub nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robert-
son, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991); Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
16 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
17 See generally Bear Lodf/!, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448. 
18 See FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Introduction; FONSI, supra 
note 1, parts G-18, G-20. 
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the FCMP are: (1) "To preserve and protect the monument's natural 
and cultural resources for present and future generations"; (2) "To 
manage recreational climbing on the tower"; (3) "To increase visitor 
awareness of American Indian beliefs and traditional cultural prac-
tices at Devils Tower"; and (4) "To provide the monument with a 
guide for managing climbing use that is consistent with the NPS man-
agement policies and other monument management plans. "19 
The FCMP implemented a variety of measures to achieve these 
ends, from limiting the use of power drills and requiring camouflaged 
climbing gear, to regulating the placement of road signs.20 The most 
significant and contentious aspects of the FCMP,21 however, con-
cerned three different restrictions on technical rock climbing on Dev-
ils Tower.H. 
1. The Stake Ladder Closure 
First, the FCMP called for a mandatory year-round closure of the 
Old Stake Ladder Route due to the ladder's cultural and historical 
significance.25 Two local ranchers, William Rogers and Willard Ripley, 
constructed a stake ladder in one of the cracks on the tower and re-
corded the first ascent on July 4, 1893.24 The ladder remained and was 
climbed occasionally until the lower 100 feet of the ladder were re-
moved for visitor safety in 1927.25 The upper portion of the ladder was 
left intact and remains today as a memorial to the first recorded as-
cent of the tower.26 The Wyoming State Historic Preservation Office 
(SHiPO) evaluated the historic stake ladder in 1994 and found it eli-
gible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places.27 No 
negative effects to this historic resource are expected under the 
19 FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Objectives. 
20 See FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management Plan. 
21 See FONSI, supra note 1, passim. 
22 See FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Current Climbing Use and 
Management; FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management 
Plan, A VolWltary Closure to Climbing; FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final 
Clintbing Management Plan, Raptor Nest Protection. 
IS SeeFCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Current Climbing Use and 
Management; FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Climbing History; 
FCMP, supra note 1, Environmental Consequences, Cultural Resources, Historic Resources. 
24 See FCMP, supra note 1, Purpose and Need for the Plan, Clintbing History. 
2T>Seeid. 
2SSeeid. 
27 Seeid.; FCMP, supra note 1, Environmental Consequences, Cultural Resources. 
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FCMP since the route in which it is located will remain permanently 
closed to climbing.2s 
2. The Raptor Closure 
The FCMP also called for a mandatory seasonal prohibition 
against climbing on portions of the tower near raptor nesting sites to 
ensure the viability of the prairie falcon population.29 Only one pair 
of prairie falcons is currently thought to nest on Devils Tower, and it is 
widely believed that climbing near potential or actual nesting sites 
disturbs the raptors and disrupts the fledging process. so Prairie fal-
cons are not endangered or threatened, but they are protected under 
federal law in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act!1 and the Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act,!2 as well as under NPS regulations that prohibit 
frightening nesting or breeding wildlife.!! According to the FCMP, 
"the goal of the raptor nest protection strategy is to allow falcons to 
freely select and establish nest sites and occupy their nest for the du-
ration of the breeding season without being stressed by climbers on 
the tower. "M 
3. The Sacred Site Closure 
Finally, the FCMP requested that climbers voluntarily refrain 
from climbing on the entire tower throughout the month of June in 
deference to Indian sacred ceremonies.!5 Several Indian tribes recog-
nize Devils Tower as a sacred site, and it is the location of sundry tra-
ditional sacred practices including prayer offerings, vision quests, the 
leaving of prayer bundles, sweatlodge rites, and the Sun Dance.!6 The 
goal of the '\roluntary ban" is to mitigate the impacts of climbing on 
28 SeeFCMP, supra note 1, Pwpose and Need for the Plan, Climbing History. 
29 See FCMP, supra note 1, Pwpose and Need for the Plan, Current Climbing Use and 
Management; FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management 
Plan, Raptor Nest Protection. 
so See FCMP, supra note 1, Pwpose and Need for the Plan, Current Climbing Use and 
Management; FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management 
Plan, Raptor Nest Protection. 
31 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994). 
31 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1994). 
33 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.2(a)(2) (1987). 
34 FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management Plan, Rap-
tor Nest Protection. 
3& See FCMP, supra note 1, Action Elements of the Final Climbing Management Plan, A 
Voluntary Closure to Climbing inJune. 
!6Seeid. 
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Indian traditional cultural practices.s, Because the NPS complied with 
the "voluntary ban" by refusing to issue commercial climbing permits 
in June, the voluntary ban was mandatory in effect vis-a.-vis commer-
cial guides.!IS 
B. The FCMP Goes to Court 
No one has challenged the mandatory restrictions on climbing 
for purposes of ladder and raptor protection. A group of climbers and 
commercial guides, however, promptly filed suit against the de facto 
mandatory closure of Devils Tower for protection of Indian sacred 
sites on constitutional grounds.lI9 Drawing from a jumbled quiver of 
inferences, they essentially argued that their right to climb on Devils 
Tower-wherever such a right comes from-may not be interfered 
with in order to ensure the Indians' ability to exercise their religion 
freely.40 They concluded that the NPS's policy of not issuing recrea-
tional climbing permits (which, in fact, are issued at the Agency's dis-
cretion) compromises the constitutional guarantee of religious free-
dom.41 
In the spring of 1996, the district court--citing Establishment 
Clause concerns about restricting climbers' rights in deference to re-
ligious interests-granted a preliminary injunction that forced the 
NPS to issue climbing permits for commercial climbing services in 
June.42 In December 1996, the NPS reviewed the FCMP and rescinded 
the de facto mandatory provision denying permits to commercial in-
terests.4lI Rather than comply with the voluntary ban itself, the NPS 
reluctantly issued commercial climbing permits with the hope that 
the guides themselves would choose to comply.44 Since November 
1996, the NPS's restriction on climbing in June to protect Indian sa-
"Seeid. 
58Seeid. 
59 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp.2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 
1998). 
40 See id. at 1451-52. 
41 Seeid. 
42Seeid. 
4SSeeid. 
44 Telephone Interview with Chas Cartwright, Superintendent of Devils Tower Na-
tional Monument (Nov. 4, 1998). 
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cred interests in the tower has been left entirely to climbers' discre-
tion.45 
Still, the same group of climbers and commercial guides again 
challenged the voluntary ban in April 1998.46 This time the court up-
held the NPS's voluntary policy.47 In dicta that bordered on an advi-
sory opinion, however, Judge Downes ominously asserted that any at-
tempt to resuscitate the mandatory restriction on commercial climb-
ing as a means to protect Indian sacred interests in Devils Tower 
would be "ill-conceived."48 
Judge Downes' statement reflects a consistently formal judicial 
vision of Indian religious freedom generally, and of sacred site protec-
tion specifically.49 The next section of this Note addresses the roots of 
this formalism and posits an alternative theory of "full" religious free-
dom by which the NPS's attempt to protect Devils Tower as a sacred 
site would not be "ill-conceived."so 
II. Two VISIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment figure prominently 
in the land-use controversy at Devils Tower.51 To what extent must or 
may the federal government allow Indians to exercise their religion 
freely on federal land, and within what limitations? Volumes have 
been written on the scope and interplay of the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses,5! and there is a vein of scholarship specifically 
45 Id. Compliance has been roughly 85%, meaning the number of people climbing in 
June since the voluntary ban was implemented in 1996 is 85% less than the number of 
people who climbed inJune 1995. 
46 See Bear Lodgr, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1448. 
47 Seeid. at 1456-57. 
48 Id. at 1452. 
49 See cases cited supra note 15. 
50 See Bear Lodgr, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1452. 
51 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
!It See, e.g.,JESSE H. CROPER, SECURING REUGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE REuGION CLAUSES (1995); BETTE NoVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING 
THE FREE ExERCISE OF REuGION: THE CoNSITlTUTlON AND AMERICAN PLURAUSM (1997); 
MEIuw.. D. PETERSON AND RoBERT C. VAUGHAN, THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR REuGIOUS 
FREEDoM (1990); EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE REuGJON CLAUSES OF THE 
FIRsT AMENDMENT (Paul J. Weber ed., 1990); Aviant Soifer, The FuUness of Time, in REu~ 
ION AND THE LAw: OBUGATION OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH (Nancy Rosen-
blum ed. forthcoming 2000); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 
(1982); David C. Williants and Susan H. Wtlliams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 
CoRNELL L. REv. 769 (1991); John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in 
theAmerican Constitutional&periment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371 (1996). 
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regarding the application of the Religion Clauses to conflicts between 
Indians trying to preserve their traditional sacred sites and the devel-
opmental tendencies of the federal land management agencies.5l1 Yet 
courts scarcely have considered the Indian claims in any but the 
strictest, most limiting terms.54 There is, however, an alternative the-
ory of "full" religious freedom which would support the NPS's effort 
to protect Indian sacred interests in Devils Tower.55 
A. A Fqrmal Vision of Religious Freedom 
Over the past two decades, the Federal Judiciary has heard a 
number of cases brought by Indians and affiliated groups trying to 
protect Indian sacred sites located on land managed by the United 
States government.56 In every case, the Indian interest in protecting 
specific sites imbued with traditional sacred significance ultimately 
succumbed to the federal government's interest.57 
1. The Free Exercise Clause 
The federal government, as owner/manager of public lands, rou-
tinely has acted or has permitted private actions that rendered Indian 
sacred sites inaccessible and unusable for religious ceremonies.58 By 
flooding a valley59 or a canyon,60 for example, or by building a road 
53 See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, The IUusion of Religious Freedom for Indigemn.tS Ameri-
cans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363, 369-72 (1986); Celia Byler, Free Access or Free Exercise?: A Choice 
Between Mineral Development and American Indian Sacred Site Preservation on Public Lands, 22 
CONN. L. REv. 397 (1990); Raymond Cross and Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils 7bwer at the 
Crossroads: The National Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources 
in the 21st Century, 18 PuB. LAND &: RESOURCES L. REv. 5 (1997); RebekahJ. French, Free 
Exercise of Religion on the Public Lands, 11 PuB. LAND L. REv. 197 (1990); Rayanne J. Griffin, 
Sacred Site Protection Against a BacluJrop of Religious Intolerance, 31 ThLsA LJ. 395 (1995); Ann 
M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands: Resolving Conflicts Between 
Religious Use and Multipk Use at El MalfJais National Monument, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 133 
(1994); Dean B. Suagee, 'llibal Voices in Histuric Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural 
Bridgrs, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REv. 145 (1996); Fred Unmack, Equality Under the 
First Amendment: Protecting Native American Religious Practices on Public Lands, 8 PuB. LAND L. 
REv. 165 (1987); Anastasia P. Wmslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in 
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 1291 (1996). 
54 See cases cited supra note 15. 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 68-100. 
5& See cases cited supra note 15. 
&7 See id. Sadly, this pattern will be unremarkable to anyone with an elementary sense 
of American history. 
MSeeid. 
59 See generally Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
60 See generally Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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through a high alpine area,61 the government has made it impossible 
in practice for Indians to exercise their religion.62 In each case, how-
ever, a federal court held that such destructive government activity 
was not an improper burden on the Indians' freedom to exercise 
their religious beliefs within the guarantees of the First Amendment.63 
This conclusion-that rendering the practice of religion impossible 
does not burden the free exercise of that religion-seems plausible 
only if one distinguishes free exercise of religion from fuU exercise of 
religion. 
2. The Establishment Clause 
Another popular argument against protecting Indian sacred sites 
is couched in a view of the Establishment Clause as a limiting princi-
ple conspiring against "religious servitudes"64 on the land. On this 
formalistic view, government protection of Indian sacred sites is a vir-
tual per se violation of the constitutional prohibition against estab-
lishment of religion.55 In a passage cited by the Tenth Circuit in Ba-
doni v. Higginson, Judge Learned Hand stated the formal construction 
of the Establishment Clause: "The First Amendment ... gives no one 
the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities .... We must 
accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the 
compromise necessary in communal life."66 It is this formalism that 
led Judge Downes to offer his "ill-conceived" assertion.67 But there is 
an alternative, more inclusive approach to religious freedom which 
supports NPS's efforts to protect Indian religious practices at Devils 
Tower. 
61 See gmerally Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass 'n., 485 V.S. 439 (1988). 
62 See, e.g., Lyng, 485 V.S. 439; Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; &quoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
M See, e.g., Lyng, 485 V.S. 439; Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; &quoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
64 Lyng, 485 V.S. at 452. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179. 
M See, e.g., Lyng, 485 V.S. at 452; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179. 
66 Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179 (quoting Judge Hand's opinion in Otten v. Baltimore and O. 
R Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Gir. 1953». 
67 Bear Lodge Multiple Vse Ass'n. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1452 (D. Wyo. 1998). 
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B. A Full Vision of Religious Freedom 
1. Fullness and Free Exercise 
In opposition to the formalist interpretation, some have argued 
that freedom, equality, and fullness are concrescent terms that ought 
to function in unison to ensure practical protection of the free exer-
cise of religious beliefs,68 which has been termed the "first liberty," 
"first freedom," and "the most inalienable and sacred of all human 
rights. "69 Chief among the supporters of this expanded, realistic con-
struction of religious freedom are two veritable edificios of the 
American discourse on rights and freedoms: Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison.'7O As Jefferson toiled over the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Philadelphia during the summer of 1776, he also found 
time to prepare a draft of the Virginia Constitution, a task he consid-
ered much more important. '71 The terminology used by Jefferson in 
the Religion Clause in his draft of the Virginia Constitution is 
significant: "All persons shall have full and.free liberty of religious opin-
ion; nor shall any be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious 
institution.'''72 Over the course of the same dramatic summer, James 
Madison, who was to become Jefferson's close friend and political 
ally,'7l1 proposed a Religion Clause to the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
arrived at independently but which bore a remarkable resemblance to 
jefferson's language: 
That religion, or the duty to which we owe our Creator, and 
the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of 
reason and conviction only, not of violence or compulsion, 
all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it, 
according to the dictates of conscience, and therefore, that 
no man or class of men ought, on account of religion, to be 
invested with the peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor sub-
68 See Soifer, supra note 52, at 17; Witte, supra note 52, at 403-05. 
69 Witte, supra note 52, at 389 (citations omitted). 
70 The genesis of thought is a murky inquiry at best, and there is ample evidence to 
suggest that Madison andjefferson borrowed extensively from Roger Williams. For a more 
nuanced discussion of the intellectual relationship between Williams, Madison, and jeffer-
son and the generation of "fullness," see Soifer, supra note 52, at 7-16. 
71 See Soifer, supra note 52, at 9. 
'12 Boyd, supra note 13 (emphasis added). 
7S One of the bedrooms at Monticello is named "Mr. Madison's room" as a testament 
to the amount of time Madison spent at jefferson's estate. See ROBER.T F. 1EDEsclD,jr., THE 
U.S. CoNSTITUTION AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 8 (6th ed. 1997). 
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jected to any penalties or disabilities unless, under color of 
religion, the preservation of equal liberty and the existence 
of the state be manifestly endangered.74 
317 
Thirteen years later Madison again invoked fullness in an effort 
to protect religious freedom, this time in his proposed First Amend-
ment: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of relig-
ious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, 
nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or 
on any pretext, infringed. "75 Of course, the First Amendment as 
adopted does not contain fullness language.76 Yet some think that the 
deletion of the word full was nothing more than stylistic editing rather 
than a content-based reduction intended to alter the meaning of the 
guarantee of religious freedom.77 
The lack of fullness, however, has made a great difference in free 
exercise jurisprudence.78 It is generally accepted that people should 
be free to exercise their religious beliefs in keeping with the most ba-
sic guarantee of equality. A guarantee of freedom and equality, how-
ever, is "an empty form having no substantive content of its own. "79 
Indeed, "'equal' seems only to require even-handed process. "80 Full-
ness, however, imbues the parchment rights of freedom and equality 
with "substantive content."81 Fullness considers the practical reality of 
equality and freedom, rather than simple-minded adherence to the 
74 WILLIAM C. RIvEs, 1 HISTORY OF THE LIn: AND TIMEs OF JAMES MADISON 141-42 
(1970) (emphasis added). 
75 Cogan, supra note 12, at 1 (emphasis added). 
76 "Full and equal" language appeared in other contexts, however. The 1866 Civil 
Rights Act stated in the first paragraph: "Citizens of every race and color ... shall have the 
same right ... to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
son and property as is enjoyed by white citizens" Civil Rights Act, 1866, ch. 31,14 Stat. 27-
30 (emphasis added). The 1875 Civil Rights Act contains similar language: "All persons ... 
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of 
public amusement." Civil Rights Act, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (emphasis added). More 
recently, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 asserted as its general rule: "No indi-
vidual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation." Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, § 302(a) , 104 Stat. 355 (1990)(emphasis added). 
77 See Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1482 (1991); Soifer, supra note 52, at 15. 
78 See, e.g., Soifer, supra note 52, at 36-37; Westen, supra note 52, at 596. 
79 Westen, supra note 52, at 596. 
80 Soifer, supra note 52 at 17. 
81 Id.; Westen, supra note 52 at 596. 
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theoretical strictures of formal reasoning.82 Put another way, fullness 
ensures the effect of freedom and equality in one's quotidian exis-
tence.83 
It is in the application of freedom and equality to people's lives 
and circumstances that fullness makes all of the difference.84 "Full and 
free" or "full and equal" expression of religious beliefs is distinct from 
a formalistic interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. And nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the strand of cases involving Indian at-
tempts to protect sacred sites.85 
2. Fullness and Establishment 
It is not the purpose of the Establishment Clause to wring the 
vestiges of fullness from the Free Exercise Clause by preventing the 
government from ensuring the practice of religion.86 Rather the Es-
tablishment Clause provides an assurance against government-
imposed religion, and it prevents one religion from trampling the 
rights of others.87 The Establishment Clause decidedly does not re-
quire the subordination of religious interests to contrary secular in-
terests such as rock climbing.88 
The disestablishment of religion was a response to a general fear 
that one set of religious beliefs might come to overwhelm all others, 
thereby rendering the free exercise of those subordinated beliefs pro-
foundly meaningless.89 Disestablishment thus functions as a mecha-
nism supporting the "first freedom" embodied in the Free Exercise 
Clause.90 Madison suggested as much in his Memorial and Remon-
8l! See Soifer, supra note 52, at 17; Westen, supra note 52, at 596. 
8S See Soifer, supra note 52, at 17; Westen, supra note 52, at 596. 
84 It is not my position that ensuring fullness of the free exercise guarantee necessarily 
trumps a competing showing of a compelling interest. No constitutional right is so abso-
lute. Where the government offers a substantial compelling interest, the right to full and 
free exercise of one's religion must give way in the manner of other constitutionally guar-
anteed rights. 
85 See cases cited supra note 15. 
86 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 52. at 97-100; Evans, supra note 52, at 210; Weber, supra 
note 52, at 61. 
87 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 52, at 97-100; Evans, supra note 52, at 210; Weber, supra 
note 52, at 61. 
88 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 52, at 97-100; Evans, supra note 52, at 210; Weber, supra 
note 52, at 61. 
89 SeeJames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 
8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (Robert A Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 
1973). 
90 See id. 
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strance: "A just Government ... will be best supported which protects 
his person and property; by neither invading the equal rights of any 
Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another. "91 Jefferson 
also believed that disestablishment was a means to free exercise rather 
than a check on religious liberty.92 In his words, the Establishment 
Clause prohibited government 
from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doc-
trines, discipline, or exercises ... [and from] the power of 
effecting any uniformity of time or matter among them. Fast-
ing and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining of them 
an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to de-
termine for itself the times for these exercises, and the ob-
jects proper for them, according to their own particular ten-
ets.9! 
Only after this "first freedom" is ensured may the Establishment 
Clause be invoked to limit the tyranny ofa particular group's religious 
exercise over another's.M 
Several early drafts of the First Amendment framed disestablish-
ment in terms of the relationships between sects of religious beliefs: 
"Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society 
in preference to others ";95 "Congress shall make no law establishing 
any particular denomination of religion in preference to another. "96 
In light of these early drafts, the Establishment Clause should be un-
derstood to enhance and ensure the fullness of one's freedom to ex-
ercise religious beliefs rather than as a limiting principle.97 Moreover, 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause should be al-
lowed to function together as "an interlocking and interdependent 
shield" in the protection of full religious freedom.98 Fullness of relig-
ious exercise, emboldened by the supporting rather than limiting dis-
91Id. 
lit See Witte, supra note 52, at 401 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel 
Miller (1808), reprinted in 11 THE WRITINGS OF lH:OMAS JEFFERSON 428-29 (1904». 
9S Witte, supra note 52, at 401 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel 
Miller (1808), reprinted in 11 THE WRITINGS OF lH:OMAS JEFFERSON 428-29 (1904». 
94 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 52, at 97-100; Evans, supra note 52, at 210; Weber, supra 
note 52, at 61; Madison, supra note 89, at 298. 
9S Version first rejected by the Senate, then reconsidered and passed by the Senate on 
Sept. 3, 1789. 1 Journal of the First Session of the Senate 70 (1802), as cited in Witte, supra 
note 52, at 402. 
96 Version rejected by the Senate on Sept. 3, 1789. 1d. at 117. 
9'1 See Witte, supra note 52, at 403. 
96 1d. at 404. 
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establishment of one religion vis-a.-vis another, would suggest that 
communal life must accommodate as much as possible our sundry 
religious "idiosyncrasies," not vice-versa.99 In the context of Indian sa-
cred site protection, however, the courts have adopted a dichotomous 
conception of the First Amendment Clauses, which sets the Estab-
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause at cross-purposes.1OO 
III. THE EARLY PRECEDENTS 
A. American Indian Religi()Us Freedom and Restoration Act 
After years (centuries?) of neglecting Indian sacred and cultural 
interests, Congress passed the American Indian Freedom and Resto-
ration Act (AIRFA) in 1978.101 AIRFA was intended to force govern-
ment agencies to recognize, consider, and respect traditional Indian 
religious practices.10! However, Rep. Morris K. Udall (D-AZ), cospon-
sor of the bill, asserted at the time of AIRFA's passage that the Act 
"had no teeth" because AIRFA did not create any legal rights. lOS In-
stead, AIRFA "depends on Federal administrative good will for its im-
plementation. "1M 
Since AIRFA was passed into law, several Indian groups have 
brought suits against public land management agencies in order to 
force the government to respect their religious interests.Io5 Because 
AIRFA is toothless,loo however, Indian plaintiffs have relied solely on 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to support their 
claims.I07 The following discussion of these cases reveals the evolution 
of a test for determining the extent to which the federal government 
may interfere with Indian religious practices without violating the 
Free Exercise Clause.los 
99 See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Judge Hand's 
opinion in Otten v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953»; see generally 
Soifer, supra note 52. 
100 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1988); 
Badoni, 638 F.2d 172 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). 
102 See Hooker, supra note 53, at 137. 
105 [d. at 133,137; 124 Cong. Rec. 21,444, 21,445 (1978). 
104 Barsh, supra note 53, at 369-72. 
105 See cases cited supra note 15. 
106 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
107 See Hooker, supra note 53, at 137. 
108 See cases cited supra note 15; see also Hooker, supra note 100, at 137-38. 
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1. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority 
In one of the original sacred site claims brought following pas-
sage of AIRFA, Cherokee plaintiffs contested plans for the Tennessee 
Valley Authority's (TVA) Tellico Dam.109 The same dam which focused 
attention on the tiny snail darter and unveiled the power of the En-
dangered Species ActUO also stirred contemporary jurisprudence re-
garding Indian religious freedoms.111 Plaintiffs in the fabled snail 
darter case trumpeted the fatal effects of damming a watershed: the 
water temperature would be altered, migratory spawning patterns 
would be disrupted, traditional feeding behaviors would be obsolete, 
and so forth.1l2 And they won.m The Supreme Court held that build-
ing the Tellico Dam would violate the Endangered Species Act by de-
stroying the last known habitat of the endangered snail darter.u4 The 
Tellico Dam project was later exempted from compliance with the 
ESA (and also notably from the Supreme Court decision construing 
the ESA) by a shotgun act of Congress shepherded by Senator How-
ard Baker (R-lN), clearing the way for the subsequent collision be-
tween the dam and Indian religious practices.l15 
The plans for Tellico Dam called for the impoundment of water 
in the Tellico Reservoir on the Little Tennessee River, thereby 
flooding the Little Tennessee River Valley.u6 Cherokee plaintiffs as-
serted that some of the land in the valley was sacred to their religion 
and a vital part of their religious practices.ll7 Flooding the valley and 
burying these sacred sites deep under water, the Cherokee con-
tended, would deny them access to sacred sites indispensable to their 
religious practices.llS For all practical purposes, construction of the 
Tellico Dam and the concomitant flooding of the Valley would pre-
vent the Cherokee from exercising their religion. Judge Robert L. 
109 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th eir. 1980), affg 480 F. 
Supp.608 (1979). 
110 S«Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
111 S« infra text accompanying notes 133-75. 
II! S« generally Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
1l5S«id. 
1l4S«id. 
115 S« Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp.608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). 
For a more thorough discussion and analysis of the ESA-1VA controversy, see ZYGMUNT 
J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENvIRONMENTAL LAw AND POllCY: NATURE LAw AND SOCIETY 672-86 
(2d ed. 1998). 
116 S« Sequuyah, 480 F. Supp. at 610. 
117 S« id. at 610-11. 
118 S« id. 
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Taylor recognized this in his opinion for the district court: "The Court 
assumes that the land to be flooded is considered sacred to the 
Cherokee religion and that active practitioners of that religion would 
want to make pilgrimages to this land as a precept of their religion. "119 
Moreover, the court conceded that impoundment of the Tellico Res-
ervoir would prevent access to this sacred land.l20 
By construing the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause very 
narrowly, however, Judge Taylor allowed the Tellico Dam project to 
continue unimpeded.l2l "An essential element to a claim under the 
Free Exercise Clause," Judge Taylor reasoned, "is some form of gov-
ernmental coercion of actions which are contrary to religious be-
lief. "122 And in this case Judge Taylor found: "The impoundment of 
the Tellico Dam has no coercive effect on plaintiff's religious beliefs 
or practices. "12S Judge Taylor concluded his analysis by stating the 
great egalitarian principle to be found in flooding the Little Tennes-
see River Valley: "The flooding of the Little Tennessee will prevent 
everyone, not just plaintiffs, from having access to the land in ques-
tion."124 
Legal formalism clearly carried the day in Judge Taylor's opinion 
in Sequoyah. In the strictest literal sense, flooding the Valley would not 
coerce the Cherokee to act in a manner contrary to their religious 
beliefs.125 Moreover, everybody-except perhaps adventurous scuba 
divers-was denied access to the land on equal terms.126 Such a 
stunted view of the constitutional guarantee hardly protects the 
Cherokee in the exercise of their religion. By the terms of this deci-
sion, the government does not violate the Free Exercise Clause when 
it engages in or permits activity which knowingly renders the exercise 
of religion impossible.127 
A consideration of fullness, whether directly or obliquely, vis-a.-vis 
the Cherokee's right to exercise their religion freely is entirely lacking 
in Judge Taylor's decision in Sequoyah. The opinion did not consider 
the practical effect that impounding the Tellico Reservoir would have 
on the Cherokee's ability to practice their religion effectively, or at all, 
119 Id. at 611. 
120 See id. at 612. 
121 See Sequuyah, 480 F. Supp. at 611-12. 
122 Id. at 611. 
wId. at 612. 
124Id. 
125 See id. 
120 See Sequuyah, 480 F. Supp. at 612. 
127 Seeid. 
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for that matter. Had Judge Taylor cleared his eyes of the formalist 
myopia, he would have seen clearly that his decision left the Chero-
kee's freedom to exercise their religion vacuous. Without considera-
tion of fullness, the Cherokees' right to free exercise is meaningless. 
The district court gave greater credence to the Cherokee's free 
exercise claim than the claim received on appeal.128 The appellate 
court discarded the Cherokee's claim for lack of centrality.I29 While 
Judge Lively's opinion for the Sixth Circuit recognized that the 
Cherokee beliefs constituted a religion, he found that the sacred sites 
to be flooded by the Tellico Dam project were not central to the 
Cherokee religion and therefore not protected under the First 
Amendment.1M 
In his concise, tepid dissent from the Sixth Circuit's decision in 
Sequoyah, Judge Merritt described sacred site protection as "a confus-
ing and essentially uncharted area of the law under the Free Exercise 
Clause. "1~1 Future cases and decisions further obfuscated any Indian 
right to practical, full, and free exercise of religion.I~2 
2. Badoni v. Higginson 
Badoni v. Higginson involved claims similar to those of the Chero-
kee that were defeated in Sequoyah.m In fact, these two nearly con-
temporaneous cases reinforce one another.1M Badoni also involved 
Indian opposition to a dam and reservoir project which flooded sa-
cred sites.135 In Badoni, Navajo plaintiffs claimed that, by impounding 
Colorado River water behind Glen Canyon Dam, the federal govern-
ment drowned some of their gods and rendered sacred prayer spots 
inaccessible, thereby denying Navajo religious practitioners the ability 
to exercise their religion freely.1!16 
Writing for the district court, Judge Aldon J. Anderson granted 
summary judgment for the government because the Navajo did not 
128 SeeSequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163-65 (6th Cir. 1980). 
129 Id. 
130 See iii. Although insulting, this centrality inquiry-premised on a subjective evalua-
tion of another's religious convictions--appeared in other sacred site cases until Justice 
O'Connor effectively rejected it in Lyng. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. 
lSI Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
152 See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 
F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
155 See Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Utah 1977). 
154 See iii. 
155 See iii. 
156 See id. 
324 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:307 
present a cognizable free exercise claim, holding that they had no 
property interest in Glen Canyon.lS7 Alternatively, Judge Anderson 
found that even if the Navajo did exhibit a cognizable right, it still 
would be trumped by the government's compelling interest in main-
taining Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir as a major multi-state water 
and power project.l58 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the 
Navajo's free exercise claim was dependent upon an assertion of 
property rights. l39 Mter positing that the proper inquiry is whether 
the government action created a burden in the form of a coercive ef-
fect on the Navajo's free exercise of religion, Judge Logan escaped 
this thread of inquiry by finding a compelling interest for the gov-
ernment's action: "The government's interest in maintaining the [wa-
ter] capacity of Lake Powell ... outweighs plaintiff's religious inter-
est. "140 Judge Logan reasoned that ensuring the ability of the Navajo 
to exercise their religion freely would require drawing down the res-
ervoir to a level which would adversely impact the water supply for the 
arid Upper Basin States of the Colorado River Project (Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) .141 Even if Lake Powell burdened the 
Navajo free exercise of religion, Judge Logan concluded, such a bur-
den is justified: "The government has shown an interest of a magni-
tude sufficient to justify the alleged infringements. "142 The free exer-
cise of religion, like many constitutional claims, is trumped by a 
showing of a compelling interest.143 
The Navajo brought a second claim in Badoni.l44 They asserted 
that the government implicitly sanctioned desecration of an indispen-
sable sacred site by permitting and encouraging tourists to visit Rain-
bow Bridge (the featured physical attraction at Rainbow Bridge Na-
tional Monument), thereby denying the Navajo their right to engage 
in the free exercise of religious ceremonies at that sacred site.145 As a 
remedy, the Navcyo proposed some measure of accommodation such 
lS7 See ilL at 644-45. 
158 See Badon;' 455 F. Supp. at 645-46. 
159 See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980). 
140 [d. at 177. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
145 [d. 
144 See Badon;' 638 F.2d at 177-78. 
145 [d. 
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as closing the Monument to general public access "on reasonable no-
tice when religious ceremonies are to be held there. "146 
The district court rejected this claim because the Navajo lacked 
property rights.l47 The Tenth Circuit, however, did not find the lack of 
property rights decisive.l48 The court determined that the govern-
ment did not violate the Navajo's right to exercise their religion freely 
because the government action did not compel or coerce the Navajo 
to violate the tenets of their religion.l49 Rather, the government action 
merely rendered the practical exercise of their religion impossible: 
"The government here has not prohibited plaintiff's free exercise in 
the area of Rainbow Bridge; plaintiffs may enter in the Monument on 
the same basis as other people. "150 
Badoni relied on formal doctrine to undercut the Navajo's consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to the free exercise of religion.151 Such 
disingenuous judicial formalism speaks loudly to the lack of fullness 
in the First Amendment. Had the Tenth Circuit considered the Na-
vajo claim in the "full and equal" or "full and free" context Madison 
and Jefferson proposed, the outcome of this case would have been 
quite different.152 Fullness of the Navajo right to exercise their relig-
ion freely would ensure substantive content and effectiveness of that 
right so as to require protection of Rainbow Bridge as a practical sa-
cred site.153 Without fullness, the Free Exercise Clause becomes a 
mere parchment right as it applies to Navajo religious practitioners at 
Rainbow Bridge.154 
The Tenth Circuit also invoked the Establishment Clause in re-
jecting the Navajo request for government protection of their sacred 
site.155 Judge Logan found unacceptable the Navajo request that the 
government monitor public access to Rainbow Bridge in order to al-
low the Navajo to engage in important religious ceremonies at that 
sacred site: 
146 [d. at 178. 
147 See Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644-45 (D. Utah 1977). 
146 See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176. 
149 See id. at 178. 
150 [d. 
151 See iii. 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 66-99. 
155 See iii. 
154 See iii. 
155 See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178-79. This move set the stage for future sacred site deci-
sions, especially Bear Lodge. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 
1448 (D. Wyo. 1998). 
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They seek government action to exclude others from the 
Monument, at least for short periods of time, and to control 
tourist behavior .... Issuance of regulations to exclude tour-
ists completely from the Monument for the avowed purpose 
of aiding plaintiff's conduct of religious ceremonies would 
seem a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. "156 
Judge Logan asserted the following inquiry vis-a.-vis Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Abington v. 
Schempp: 
The test may be. stated as follows: what are the purpose and 
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of 
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion.1S7 
Finding that the requested government regulation and limitation 
of tourist behavior and volume had no secular purpose and would 
serve to recreate Rainbow Bridge National Monument as "a govern-
ment-managed religious shrine," Judge Logan concluded that such 
action would violate the Establishment Clause,1s8 
3. Cases following Sequoyah and Badoni 
a. Crow v. Gullett 
Sequoyah and Badoni provided the guiding principles for decisions 
in subsequent cases of sacred site protection.l59 In Crow v. Gullett, for 
example, the district court considered Lakota and Tsistsistas claims 
that construction projects at Bear Butte and regulation of Indian ac-
156 Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178-79. 
157 Id. at 179 (quoting School Dist. of Abbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 
(1963». Although the two-pronged purpose and effect test set forth in Abbington resem-
bles both the Lemon and O'Connor tests, it is worth noting that in Bear Lodge the district 
court specifically applied only the Lemon and O'Connor tests. See infra text accompanying 
notes 223-39. 
158 Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179. 
159 See generalliy Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 
(6th Cir. 1980), affg480 F. Supp. 608 (1979). 
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cess to Bear Butte violated their free exercise rights. l60 Chief Judge 
Bogue, writing for the district court, did not question the validity or 
centrality of the religious claims: "In this case there is no dispute that 
plaintiffs' practices at Bear Butte are based on a system of beliefs that 
is religious and is sincerely held by plaintiffs. "161 Nonetheless, Judge 
Bogue concluded: 'The Free Exercise Clause places a duty upon a 
state to keep from prohibiting religious acts, not to provide the means 
or the environment for carrying them out. "162 Relying on the district 
court opinions in Sequoyah and Badoni, Judge Bogue found it 
significant that the Indians had no legal property interest in the Bear 
Butte area, and also that Indians could successfully complete their 
vision quests despite the alleged distractions.163 Moreover, Judge 
Bogue determined that the government had demonstrated a compel-
ling interest in completing the construction of a road and a parking 
10t,164 . 
b. Inupiat Community v. United States 
In Inupiat Community v. United States, the district court considered 
Inupiat opposition to oil development in large portions of the Beau-
fort and Chukchi seas on the grounds that development would dis-
rupt their hunting and gathering lifestyle, which they claimed was in-
extricable from their religious beliefs.l65 Judge Fitzgerald failed to 
recognize the Inupiat claims because the Inupiats offered no explana-
tion of either the religious significance of the hunting grounds or 
how the proposed development would interfere with the free exercise 
of their religion.l66 Moreover, Judge Fitzgerald found that the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in developing oil exploration.167 In 
conclusion, Judge Fitzgerald also cited Establishment Clause prob-
lems in the tension between "religious servitudes" and public access: 
'The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the First Amendment 
160 Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), a/I'd 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983). 
161 [d. at 790. 
162 Id. at 791. 
163 See id. at 791-92. 
164 See id. at 792-93. 
165 Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Ala. 
1982), affd746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984). 
166 Seeid. at 188-89. 
167 See id. at 189. 
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may not be asserted to deprive the public of its normal use of an 
area. "168 
c. Wils'on v. Block 
In Wils'on v. Block, Hopi and Navajo opposed a Forest Service de-
cision to permit the expansion of the Snow Bowl ski area in the San 
Francisco Peaks area of Arizona.l69 Hopi and Navajo asserted that the 
Peaks were sacred land, and neither the district court nor the appeals 
court questioned the sincerity of the Indians' religious c1aims,170 Yet 
the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that government 
permitting of a ski area on Forest Service land did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause because the government did not burden the Indians' 
religion by denying access to the sacred sites or impairing their ability 
to conduct ceremonies.l71 
The D.C. Circuit "consider[ed] separately the effects of devel-
opment upon their beliefs and upon their religious practices."172 
Judge Lumbard found that the development of the ski area did not 
penalize faith and therefore did not burden religious belief.173 With 
regard to practice, Judge Lumbard applied the Sequoyah test for indis-
pensability: "We hold that plaintiffs seeking to restrict government 
land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, dem-
onstrate that the government's proposed land use would impair a re-
ligious practice that could not be performed at any other site. "174 
Judge Lumbard found that expansion of the ski area would not tram-
ple on indispensable sacred land because the Hopi and Navajo plain-
tiffs could perform their ceremonies in other parts of the Peaks.175 
168 Id. 
169 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
170 See id. at 740. 
171 See id. at 742-46. 
172Id. at 740. 
173 See id. at 742. 
174 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744. 
175 The Wilson court explicitly "declined to follow those cases [Crow, Badoni, Sequoyah] 
which have placed primary reliance upon the government's property interest and which 
have held, apparently, that the Free Exercise Clause can never supersede the government's 
ownership rights and duties of public management." Id. at 744 n.5. 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: LYNG V. NORTHWEST INDIAN 
CEMETERY PROTECTIVE AsSOCIATION 
329 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Sequoyah, Badon~ and 
Wilson. In 1987, however, the Supreme Court heard arguments in 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.l'6 The result was 
Supreme Court affirmation of the doctrine evidenced in Sequoyah, 
Badon~ and Wilson, which denied protection to Indian sacred sites.I77 
A. Lower Court Proceedings 
Two lower courts (the District Court for the Northern District of 
California and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) rejected 
the prevailing doctrine of Sequoyah and Badoni and enjoined a Forest 
Service proposal to build a road and to permit logging in the Chim-
ney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern .Cali-
fornia because the Chimney Rock area historically was used for relig-
ious purposes by \Urok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.l78 The lower 
courts accepted the findings of a study commissioned by the Forest 
Service: 
'Successful [religious] use of the [area] is dependent upon 
and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environ-
ment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and 
an undisturbed natural setting.' The study concluded that 
constructing a road along any of the available routes 'would 
cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas 
which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems 
and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.' Accord-
ingly, the report recommended that the road not be com-
pleted.I79 
Relying largely on the conclusions presented in this study, both 
lower courts held that construction of the road would violate the In-
dians' rights as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. ISO Although 
neither court determined that construction of the road was designed 
purposefully to coerce, compel, penalize, or otherwise disrupt the 
1'76 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
111 See infra text accompanying notes 190-201. 
118 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.586 (N.D. 
Cal. 1983), affd795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). 
179 Lyng, 485 u.S. at 442. 
180 See Nurthwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 591. 
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Indian religious practices, the practical effect of constructing the road 
through the Chimney Rock area-that the Indians would be unable 
to exercise fully their religious beliefs-was enough to render the pro-
ject unconstitutional.I81 
It should be clear that a formalist tack was available to the lower 
courts that heard Lyng.182 They could have rationalized the constitu-
tionality of the road through the sacred site by adhering to the strict 
theories advanced in previous sacred site protection cases and con-
cluded that the Indians' free exercise of religion was not infringed 
because the Indians could still visit the site and engage in their cere-
monies.181l At least in this case the Indians would not have to dive un-
der water to reach their sacred sites.184 
Moreover, the courts could have posited that the Indians' relig-
ious rights were not singled out for mistreatment, nor were the Indi-
ans compelled to act in violation of their beliefs.185 Such arguments 
had been used in other cases to demonstrate the continuing freeness 
(if not fullness) of Indian religious practices in spite of government 
dam building or other such actions.186 Remarkably, the lower courts 
broke ranks from the common theories in sacred site cases and in-
voked fullness vis-a.-vis the Indians' right to exercise their religion,187 
Construction of the road technically might not have extinguished the 
freedom of Indians to exercise their religion, but it would have re-
stricted their exercise of religion in practical and effective ways.188 
Both the district court and the court of appeals, therefore, implicitly 
found that construction of the road violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because such government action would deny the Indians fullness with 
their freedom.189 The triumph of a Jeffersonian/Madisonian concep-
tion of full religious freedom, however, was short-lived,190 
181 See id. 
182 See generaUy Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'g 455 F. 
Supp.141 (1977); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'g 
480 F. Supp. 608 (1979). 
18S See generally Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
184 See generaUy Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
185 See generaUy Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
186 See generaUy Badoni, 638 F.2d 172; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159. 
187 See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson 565 F. Supp. 589, 591 
(N.D. Cal. 1983). 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-50 
(1988). See also supra text accompanying notes 66-75. 
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B. Justice O'Connor's Majority opinion 
The Supreme Court disputed neither the sincerity of the Indians' 
religious claims nor the study's conclusion that the government's 
proposed action would have a severe, adverse, and perhaps even fatal, 
effect on the Indians' ability to exercise their religion,191 However, in 
what Justice Brennan in dissent called a "cruelly surreal result,"192 the 
majority reversed the lower courts and held that destroying a sacred 
site essential to the exercise of religion does not burden the exercise 
of religion.19~ 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, dismissed any nee~ for 
a compelling interest showing by the government.l94 Instead, 
O'Connor asserted that in this case neither would the Indians be "co-
erced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; 
nor would governmental action penalize religious activity by denying 
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges en-
joyed by other citizens. "195 Although the government action would 
render the Indians' free exercise right meaningless by destroying a 
sacred site where that free exercise takes place, the Court found that 
building a road was merely the "incidental effect" of a government 
program.l96 
Justice O'Connor explicitly rejected any legal accounting for the 
effects of the government action on religious practice: 
The crucial word in the constitutional text is "prohibit": "For 
the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the gov-
ernment cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what 
the individual can exact from the government." Whatever 
may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions 
on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct 
by government of its own affairs, the location of the line 
cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental 
action on a religious objector's spiritual development.197 
The rationale for such line-drawing, which banishes any effects 
test, altogether suffers from the Court's failure to consider the Free 
191 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. 
192 [d. at 472 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
195 See id. at 450-51. 
194 See id. at 447, 450. 
195 [d. at 449. 
196 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. 
197 [d. at 451. 
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Exercise Clause in the context of fullness. Echoing Learned Hand's 
earlier admonition that people accommodate their lives to the 
machinations of contemporary politics and popular culture, 
O'Connor wrote: "However much we might wish that it were other-
wise, government simply could not operate if it were required to sat-
isfY every citizen's religious needs and desires. "198 Fearing creation of 
a "religious servitude" on a tract of federal land,199 the Court pro-
pounded the government's property interest in National Forest land: 
"Whatever rights [under the Constitution] the Indians may have to 
the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Govern-
ment of its right to use what is, after all, its land. "200 
O'Connor also expounded on the purported egalitarian premise 
underlying formalline-drawing: 'The First Amendment must apply to 
all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public 
programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. "201 In that 
single sentence, the Court recognized that the Indians' right to exer-
cise their religious beliefs deserved equality and freedom. Any practi-
cal enforcement of those constitutional promises, however, was en-
tirely lacking in the Court's consideration. An effects test that 
considers the practicality and fullness of the Indians' right to exercise 
their religious beliefs is essential to ensure that equality and freedom 
do not go gently into the night. 
C. justice Brennan's Dissent 
Justice Brennan's powerful dissent in Lyng included an implicit 
recognition of fullness. Joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, 
Brennan scoffed at the hypocrisy of a ruling which allows the Indians 
a "freedom [that] amounts to nothing more than the right to believe 
that their religion will be destroyed,"202 and "leaves Native Americans 
with absolutely no constitutional protection against perhaps the grav-
est threat to their religious practices. "203 Brennan challenged the 
Court's hair-splitting formalism, including its distinction between 
governmental actions which coerce, compel, or prohibit religious ac-
tivity and governmental actions which render religious activity impos-
sible: 
198 [d. at 452. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. at 453. 
201 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452. 
~ [d. at 477 (Brennan,J., dissenting). 
203 [d. at 459. 
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Ultimately the Court's coercion test turns on a distinction 
between governmental actions that compel affirmative con-
duct inconsistent with religious belief, and those govern-
mental actions that prevent conduct consistent with religious 
belief. In my view, such a distinction is without constitutional 
significance .... Religious freedom is threatened no less by 
governmental action that makes the practice of one's chosen 
faith impossible than by government programs that pressure 
one to engage in conduct which is inconsistent with religious 
beliefs. Both common sense and our prior cases teach us, 
therefore, that governmental action that makes the practice 
of a given faith more difficult necessarily penalizes that prac-
tice and thereby tends to prevent adherence to religious be-
lief.204 
333 
Mter all, Brennan implied, there can be hardly any action more in-
consistent with one's religious beliefs than one that makes it impossi-
ble to practice at all.205 
Justice Brennan rejected "the Court's premise that the form of 
the government's restraint on religious practice, rather than its effect, 
controls our constitutional analysis. "206 Instead, Brennan posited a 
constitutional inquiry based upon the harm to which the religious 
practitioners are subjected rather than the style in which the govern-
ment implements that harm.207 To do otherwise, in Brennan's words, 
allows for a "cruelly surreal result: governmental action that will virtu-
ally destroy a religion is nevertheless deemed not to 'burden' that re-
ligion. "208 
D. Cases following Lyng 
1. Manybeads v. United States 
In Lyng, the Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine posited in Se-
quoyah and Badoni. Lyng, in turn, proved dispositive in subsequent dis-
trict court decisions involving Indian claims to protect sacred sites 
l!O4 Id. at 468-69. 
205 See id. 
206 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 467. 
207 Id. at 467-68. 
208 Id. at 472 (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
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from destruction by governmental action.209 In Manybeads v. United 
States, for example, Navajo plaintiffs challenged the Navajo-Hopi Re-
location Act, which required that Navajo move to another district 
within the federal reservation system.210 Writing for the district court, 
Judge Carroll found Lyng dispositive and relied on Lyngs "religious 
servitude" finding: "However much plaintiffs may desire to perma-
nently reside where they now do that option is not available to them. 
To hold otherwise would afford plaintiffs rights, benefits and privi-
leges not enjoyed by other citizens. ''211 
2. Attakai v. United States 
In Attakai v. United States, Navajo challenged Department of the 
Interior and Bureau of Indian Mfairs construction projects on 
grounds that the governmental agencies interfered with the ability of 
the Navajo to practice their religion by irreparably disturbing and de-
stroying religious sites.212 Judge Carroll again recognized both that 
the Navajo claims were grounded in sincerely held bona fide religious 
belief, and that the construction projects would seriously interfere 
with or impair some of plaintiffs' religious practices.213 Once again, 
however, Judge Carroll applied the principles of the recent Lyng deci-
sion and concluded that Lyngwas dispositive: 
The fact that a person's ability to practice their [sic] religion 
will be virtually destroyed by a governmental program does 
not allow them to impose a religious servitude on the prop-
erty of the government .... There has been no evidence that 
the government has denied plaintiffs the right to physically 
visit or use any of those shrines or the other sites involved in 
this action.214 
209 See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp.1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), a/I'd, sub 
nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th err. 1991); Attakai v. United States, 
746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990); Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 
1989). 
210 Manybeads, 730 F. Supp. 1515. 
211 Id. at 1517-18. 
212 See746F. Supp. at 1395. 
mId. at 1403. 
214Id. at 1403-04. 
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3. Havasupai Tribe v. United States 
In Havasupai Tribe v. United States, the Havasupai Tribe challenged 
Forest Service authorization of a mining operation on grounds that 
the mine will "deny them access to sacred sites and destroy the very 
essence of their religious and cultural system. "215 Judge Strand, like 
Judge Carroll, assumed the truth of the plaintiffs' assertions about the 
religious sanctity of the Canyon Mine site and the adverse effects 
upon the Havasupai belief system, but still found Lyng dispositive.216 
In this case, as in Lyng, "plaintiffs are not penalized for their beliefs, 
nor are they prevented from practicing their religion.''217 
Judge Strand's opinion also adopted the property rights reason-
ing of Lyng: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to use the area ... 
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, 
after all, its land. "218 Judge Strand then invoked Lyngs "religious servi-
tude" trope: "Giving the Indians a veto power over activities on federal 
land would 'easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some 
rather spacious tracts of public property.'''219 
With these decisions, the legacy of Sequoyah and Badoni, as am-
plified by the Supreme Court through Lyng, seemed to control sacred 
site jurisprudence.22o The failure of any attempt by Indian groups to 
protect sacred sites on federal land on the basis of religious freedom 
seemed preordained no matter how meritorious the claim or how de-
structive the government's activity.221 And then the Bear Lodge case 
slipped into the mix. 
V. A GASP FOR FULLNESS: BEAR LoDGE 
The Bear Lodge litigation, which concerned restrictions on climb-
ing at Devils Tower, reflects the flip-side of the previous cases. In all of 
the previous sacred site protection cases, the court considered Indian 
challenges to government programs which denied their right to the 
free exercise of their religion.222 In Bear Lodge, the district court ac-
215 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Ariz. 1990); a/I'd, sub nom, Havasupai Tribe v. Robert-
son, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991). 
216 See id. at 1485. 
217 [d. 
218 [d. at 1486 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 
439,453 (1988». 
219 [d. (quoting Lyng485 U.S. at 453). 
220 See cases cited supra note 15; see also Hooker, supra note 53, at 137-38. 
221 See cases cited supra note 15; see also Hooker, supra note 100, at 137-38. 
222 See cases cited supra note 15. 
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knowledged that it confronted the converse: whether the government 
went so far in enabling the Indians' free exercise of religion as to 
breach the Establishment Clause.223 
This inquiry succeeds only insofar as the Establishment Clause 
may be understood to work at cross-purposes to the Free Exercise 
Clause. Whereas the Establishment Clause exists to support rather 
than negate the religious liberty set forth in the Free Exercise Clause, 
as previously argued, however, the climbers' rights argument should 
fai1.224 The climbers do not suggest that the National Park Service is 
favoring one religion over another, nor do they suggest that the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in allowing climbing on Devils 
Tower. They merely posit that allowing Indians to freely and fully ex-
ercise their religious beliefs hinders the climbers' engagement in a 
secular activity.225 The Establishment Clause should not be brought to 
bear in a manner so inimical to its purpose. 
Judge Downes recognized the climbers' argument, however, and 
applied both the Lemon test and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test 
from her concurrence in Lynch.226 According to the Lemon test: "A 
government action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) 
has a secular purpose, (2) does not have the principal or primary ef-
fect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an 
excessive entanglement with religion. "227 Essentially, the O'Connor 
test holds: "Government impermissibly endorses religion if its con-
duct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a mes-
sage that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or pre-
ferred. ''228 
Unlike the Court's free exercise jurisprudence in the area of sa-
cred site protection which explicitly rejects the effect of government 
action on one's ability to exercise one's religious beliefs, both Lemon 
and Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence consider the purpose and 
effect of the government action. Consequently, Judge Downes held: 
"Plaintiffs can succeed ... only if they show that the action has no 
clear secular purpose or that despite a secular purpose the actual 
22' See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp.2d 1448, 1451 (D. Wyo. 
1998). 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 86-100. 
225 See Bear Lod~, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450-52. 
226 See id. at 1453-54. 
227 [d. at 1454 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971». 
228 [d. 
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purpose is to endorse religion. "229 Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Amos, which found that a government action need not be 
wholly unrelated to religion, the court determined that "it is a permis-
sible ... purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their 
religious missions. "2l1O As to the purpose element, Judge Downes 
found: 
While the purposes behind the voluntary climbing ban are 
directly related to Native American religious practices, that is 
not the end of the analysis. The purposes underlying the ban 
are really to remove barriers to religious worship occasioned 
by public ownership of the Tower. This is in the nature of ac-
commodation, not promotion, and consequently is a legiti-
mate secular purpose.2!l1 
As to the effect element, Judge Downes found: "Actions step be-
yond the bounds of reasonable accommodation when they force peo-
ple to support a given religion. "232 Judge Downes, however, also cited 
Badoni: "The exercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be as-
serted to deprive the public of its normal use of an area. ''2!l!l "If the 
NPS is, in effect, depriving individuals of their legitimate use of the 
monument in order to enforce the tribes' rights to worship," he con-
tinued, "it has stepped beyond permissible accommodation and into 
the realm of promoting religion. The gravamen of the issue then be-
comes whether climbers are allowed meaningful access to the monu-
ment. "2M Because the ban is voluntary and not coercive, the climbers 
are not denied meaningful access. 
As to the excessive entanglement element, the Court looked at 
"the character and the purposes of the institutions that are benefited, 
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and religious authority. "2!l5 In this 
case, Judge Downes found that the NPS serves only a custodial func-
tion by creating an atmosphere more conducive to worship.236 Based 
229 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1454. 
230 Id. (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987». 
251Id. at 1455. 
232Id. 
233Id. (quoting Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (lOth Cir. 1980». 
234 Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455. 
235 Id. at 1456. 
236 See id. 
338 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:307 
on these findings, Judge Downes upheld the ''voluntary ban. ''237 As 
noted, however, he warned that a mandatory ban on climbing-a 
mandatory restriction on climbers' access to Devils Tower-would not 
pass constitutional muster.238 Consideration of the Indians' right to 
exercise their religious beliefs in the context of Madison's and Jeffer-
son's "full and equal" or "full and free" construction, however, would 
mandate protection of the Indians' sacred interest in Devils Tower. To 
do less denies Indians substantive content-fullness-with their theo-
retical free exercise of religion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Americans like to think of themselves as the progenitors of free-
dom and equality in the modern age. The Pilgrims sailed west, ac-
cording to our national mythology, to escape tyranny and persecution 
in the Old World. In the New World, they established a shining "city 
upon a hill" which we celebrate as the global model for democratic 
principles. "All men are created equal," we reassure ourselves, com-
forted with the notion that we, as a nation, proclaimed this concept to 
the world. "Let freedom ring .... " 
Yet American history is littered with the detritus of battles 
fought-both literally and in cultural discourse-over the extension 
of myriad aspects of freedom and equality to various groups. Nearly 
every American generation since the Revolution is identified with a 
rights revolution, from the antebellum struggle against slavery and 
the women's suffrage movement to late twentieth century struggles 
for equal access to places of public accommodation or to the benefits 
of marriage. These struggles suggest a darker side of the democratic, 
egalitarian national heritage we embrace so proudly. 
Our periodic fights for rights have played out on a number of 
fronts: voting booths, streets and sidewalks, battlefields, churches, res-
ervations, Greenwich Village bars, and lunch counters in North Caro-
lina. And eventually-all too slowly-America's rights revolutions 
have been contested in the political arena and in court. We may take 
pride in some of the outcomes of these struggles-a broader right to 
vote, for instance-but we also should wonder at the limited scope of 
the egalitarian, freedom-bound nature of our city upon a hill. We are 
inclined to forget the resistance to expanded conceptions of freedom 
and equality, and the sustained battles that had to be fought. Ensuring 
237 See id. at 1456-57. 
2SS See id. at 1452. 
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freedom and equality in the United States has not been as easy as the 
Declaration of Independence suggests. 
Nowhere in American history or contemporary culture are the 
concepts of freedom and equality more corrupted than vis-a.-vis 
American Indians. The tortured legacy of genocide haunts our na-
tional conscience, yet our "conquest" is revered in American mythol-
ogy and celebrated in popular culture. The 'Trail of Tears" and the 
great buffalo hunts are merely some of the most prominent, con-
certed American efforts to curtail the Indians' very existence in order 
to make room for our city upon a hill. Even today, battles are being 
fought around Indian freedom and equality and basic cultural sur-
vival. The Indians are losing once again. We should be ashamed at our 
failure to protect fully the free exercise of religion. 
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purpose is to endorse religion. "229 Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Amos, which found that a government action need not be 
wholly unrelated to religion, the court determined that "it is a permis-
sible ... purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their 
religious missions. "250 As to the purpose element, Judge Downes 
found: 
While the purposes behind the voluntary climbing ban are 
directly related to Native American religious practices, that is 
not the end of the analysis. The purposes underlying the ban 
are really to remove barriers to religious worship occasioned 
by public ownership of the Tower. This is in the nature of ac-
commodation, not promotion, and consequently is a legiti-
mate secular purpose.231 
As to the effect element, Judge Downes found: "Actions step be-
yond the bounds of reasonable accommodation when they force peo-
ple to support a given religion. "232 Judge Downes, however, also cited 
Badoni: "The exercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be as-
serted to deprive the public of its normal use of an area. "233 "If the 
NPS is, in effect, depriving individuals of their legitimate use of the 
monument in order to enforce the tribes' rights to worship," he con-
tinued, "it has stepped beyond permissible accommodation and into 
the realm of promoting religion. The gravamen of the issue then be-
comes whether climbers are allowed meaningful access to the monu-
ment. "2114 Because the ban is voluntary and not coercive, the climbers 
are not denied meaningful access. 
As to the excessive entanglement element, the Court looked at 
"the character and the purposes of the institutions that are benefited, 
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and religious authority. "235 In this 
case, Judge Downes found that the NPS serves only a custodial func-
tion by creating an atmosphere more conducive to worship.2S6 Based 
229 Bear Lod~, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1454. 
230 Ido (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saintsv.Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987». 
lSI [do at 1455. 
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on these findings, Judge Downes upheld the "voluntary ban. "2117 As 
noted, however, he warned that a mandatory ban on climbing-a 
mandatory restriction on climbers' access to Devils Towel'-would not 
pass constitutional muster.2!l8 Consideration of the Indians' right to 
exercise their religious beliefs in the context of Madison's and Jeffer-
son's "full and equal" or "full and free" construction, however, would 
mandate protection of the Indians' sacred interest in Devils Tower. To 
do less denies Indians substantive content-fullness--with their theo-
retical free exercise of religion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Americans like to think of themselves as the progenitors of free-
dom and equality in the modern age. The Pilgrims sailed west, ac-
cording to our national mythology, to escape tyranny and persecution 
in the Old World. In the New World, they established a shining "city 
upon a hill" which we celebrate as the global model for democratic 
principles. "All men are created equal," we reassure ourselves, com-
forted with the notion that we, as a nation, proclaimed this concept to 
the world. "Let freedom ring .... " 
Yet American history is littered with the detritus of battles 
fought-both literally and in cultural discourse--over the extension 
of myriad aspects of freedom and equality to various groups. Nearly 
every American generation since the Revolution is identified with a 
rights revolution, from the antebellum struggle against slavery and 
the women's suffrage movement to late twentieth century struggles 
for equal access to places of public accommodation or to the benefits 
of marriage. These struggles suggest a darker side of the democratic, 
egalitarian national heritage we embrace so proudly. 
Our periodic fights for rights have played out on a number of 
fronts: voting booths, streets and sidewalks, battlefields, churches, res-
ervations, Greenwich Village bars, and lunch counters in North Caro-
lina. And eventually-all too slowly-America's rights revolutions 
have been contested in the political arena and in court. We may take 
pride in some of the outcomes of these struggles--a broader right to 
vote, for instance-but we also should wonder at the limited scope of 
the egalitarian, freedom-bound nature of our city upon a hill. We are 
inclined to forget the resistance to expanded conceptions of freedom 
and equality, and the sustained battles that had to be fought. Ensuring 
257 Seeid. at 1456-57. 
238 See id. at 1452. 
